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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
-vsRICHARD ALLEN CHRISTENSEN,
Defendant-A ppeUant.

Case No.
12641

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE
OF THE CASE
Appellant, Richard Allen Christensen, appeals
from a conviction of grand larceny rendered by Judge
Bryant I-I. Croft in the Third Judicial District Court,
Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Appellant, Richard Allen Christensen, was fmmd
guilty by the court of the crime of grand larceny on
May 6, 1971, and was thereafter sentenced to be com-
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mitted to the Utah State Prison for the term prescribed
by law.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks a reversal of the grand larceny
conviction.
STATEJ.\;IENT OF FACTS
On November 4, 1970, George Crabtree had his
vacation trailer stolen from his home between 1 :45 p.m.
and 4:15 p.m. (R 26) Appellant along with another
man removed the trailer from Mr. Crabtree's property.
However, appellant testified that he did not intend to
steal the trailer. (R. 70)
Appellant testified that he was behind in his car
payments and so borrowed a stereo from a friend so he
could sell it and get some money. (R. 56, 58) At the '
Palace Lounge in Salt Lake City, appellant attempted
to sell the stereo. A man overheard this attempted sale
by appellant to the bartender and inquired. Appellant !
told him he was selling the stereo because he needed
some money. This man and another, calling themselves
Frank and George, said they would give appellant
$100.00 if he would move a trailer for them to Butte,
Montana. (R. 59) The younger man, George, went
with appellant and directed him to the trailer. (R. 60)
These two hooked up the trailer and went back to the
1

1
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Palace Lounge, towing the trailer, and hooked on the
wiring for the lights. (R. 60) The trailer that appellant
and George hooked up and hauled away was that of
Mr. Crabtree. Appellant testified that he believed the
trailer was Frank's. (R. 67) After the light wires were
hooked up, Frank gave appellant $100.00 to move the
trailer and $40.00 for gas. (R. 61) Frank told appellant to take the trailer to the junction just going into
Butte, Montana, and wait there, and he (Frank) would
arrange for a man to pick up the trailer. (R. 61) Appellant assumed that this man would be the one who
bought the trailer. (R. 61) This transaction in the bar
and the trailer hook-up occurred about 1 :00 p.m. (R.
60) on November 4, 1970. Appellant was able to describe the two men. ( R. 73, 7 4)
After the hook-up, appellant drove over to his
brother's work, pulling the trailer, and asked him if he
could keep the truck (appellant's brother's truck) a few
days longer to tow a trailer to Montana. (R. 61, 62)
Appellant's brother testified that he had lent his truck
to appellant a few days before November 4, 1970, and
that appellant did come to his work to ask if he could
keep the truck a few days longer. (R. 42, 44, 46)
After leaving his brother's work, appellant drove
to First Security Bank on Fourth South and J\iiain
Street in Salt Lake City, to make a car payment. (R.
62) He was pulling the trailer still and parked in front
of the bank. ( R. 80) Ile made a car payment of $40.00

at that time. (R. 62, Exhibit 1) From the bank, appellant called Sandra Potter, a friend, and asked her if
she would like to ride with him on the trip to Montana.
(R. 64) She agreed and so appellant left the bank to
pick up Sandra Potter. On the way he stopped for cof.
fee on 2100 South and l\'lain Street and then went to
Sandra Potter's house. (R. 64) He picked her up, pull·
ing the trailer, at about 4 :30 or 5 :00 p.m. on November
4, 1970. (R. 64) They left on the freeway, going north
through Brigham City, Tremonton, and into Downey,
Idaho. They got to the junction near Butte at about
3 :00 a.m. on November 5, 1970. (R. 64) Appellant
described the junction. (R. 93) After waiting a short
while, a man in a green 1957 or 1958 Chevrolet truck
drove up, asked appellant· if he was Dick Christensen,
and hooked up the trailer and hauled it away. (R. 65)
Appellant then left immediately and returned to Salt
Lake, arriving on November 5, 1970, at about 4 :00 or
5:00 p.m. (R. 66) Sandra Potter gave the same account
as to the trip to Montana. ( R. 47-50)
When appellant got home, his brother told him
the police were questioning him about a stolen trailer.
(R. 68) Appellant thereupon left town for 3 or 4 days
because he was afraid because he was on probation (U.
68) for passing a bad check. When he got back, he
told his probation officer about the episode with the
trailer. (R. 69) Appellant also called Detective Vin·
cent to straighten things out. (R. 67) Detective Vin-
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cent testified that appellant told him this account and
that appellant had called him and said he wanted to talk
to him. ( R. 35-41)

Appellant testified that he had tried to locate Frank
and George since his return, but without success. (R. 66)
The police did not attempt to locate these men. (R. 40)
Appellant testified that he thought Frank owned
the trailer and and that he did not know that he had no
authority to move the trailer. (R. 67, 70)

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE VERDICT SHOULD BE SET ASIDE
BECAUSE THE EVIDENCE WAS NOT SUFFICIENT TO SHOW THE NECESSARY INTENT FOR THE CRIME OF G R A N D
LARCENY.
The Utah Code says that larceny is the "felonious
stealing, taking, carrying, leading, or driving away the
personal property of another." 76-38-1, Utah Code
Ann., ( 1953) This, of course, means that
"the mere taking of personal property belonging to another does not constitute larceny. The
taking must be with the felonious intent to
steal, and this element must be established by
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the circumstances of the taking or other proper
proof." State v. Dubois, 64 Utah 433, 231

P. 625, 626 (1924).

Further, 76-1-41, Utah Code Ann., ( 1953) states that
all persons are capable of committing crime except
( 5) persons who commit the act . . . under an

ignorance or mistake of fact which disproves
any criminal intent.

Thus, it is clear that if appellant did believe that he had
authority to move the trailer, and if he thought it belonged to Frank, as testified, he cannot be guilty of ,
grand larceny because the requisite criminal intent is
missing. Thus the court below erred when it stated:
1

Aside from that, it is even more difficult for me
to believe that a man can get involved in a
transaction like this-assuming every word he
says is true-and not be guilty of larceny of
the trailer. (R. 99)
The above statement is clearly not an accurate statement of the law in light of the above statute
[76-1-41(5) ], because if all appellant said were true,
then he believed he had authority to move the trailer
and would be operating under a mistake of fact that
disproved any criminal intent. Thus, to the extent the
trial court decided the issue of guilt on this erroneous
basis, the judgement and verdict are in error.
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Apart from this, appellant contends that the evidence was so lacking in proof of the requisite intent
that this court must as a matter of law set aside the verdict. This court stated in State v. Dubois, supra, that
if the evidence is such that all reasonable minds
should arrive at the conclusion that the taking
was without felonious intent, then the question
becomes one of law, and the verdict of guilty
should be set aside. 231 P. at 626.
This court has also stated in State v. Allen, 56 Utah 37,
189P.84 (1920),that
Where there is no conflict, and no conflicting
inferences may legitimately be deduced from
the evidence, it is the duty of this court to declare the effect of the evidence as a matter of
law. 189 P. Ut. 90
This court said that the verdict in Allen was not supported by the evidence and held that the judgment
could not stand in that jury trial. Again, this court has
held:
We are not unmindful of the settled rule that
it is the province of the jury to weigh the testimony and determine the facts. Nevertheless,
we cannot escape the responsibility of judgment upon whether under the evidence, a jury
could, in reason, conclude that the defendant's
guilt was proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
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State v. Williams, Ill Utah 379, 180 P.2d
551, 555 ( 1947).

This court then went on to say that reasonable doubt
in the minds of the reviewing court will not cause a
verdict to be set aside, but the total picture is to be evaluated in reaching such a result.
The rules set forth by this court pay great deference to the ability of the jury to find the facts, as all
the above cases were jury trials. However, appellant
contends that where the trial is to the judge, certainly
no stronger a rule is warranted than where there is d
jury trial and this court is asked to set aside the verdict
because of the insufficiency of the evidence. Thus, tak·
ing the above rules, appellant contends this court
should as a matter of law set the verdict aside because
the evidence is such that "all reasonable minds should
arrive at the conclusion that the taking was without
felonious intent." State v. Dubois, supra.
Appellant testified that he believed it was Frank's
trailer and that he did not know that he had no author·
ity to move it. His later actions were perfectly consist·
ent with this, as was his purpose. He needed money to
pay for his car; that is how he met these two men. When
he got the money, he immediately went to the bank and
made a car payment. He made no attempt whatever to
conceal the trailer. No stealth or concealment were involved. Indeed, he drove the trailer around town to his
brother's work, to a downtown bank, to a cafe, to his

9

girl friend's. After returning and fleeing originally because of fear of probation revocation, he told his probation officer what he had done, the probation officer
telling him to forget about it. (R. 69) Appellant called
the police to straighten things out. These actions are
totally consistent with appellant's stated purpose and
intent, and totally inconsistent with the intent requisite
for a conviction of grand larceny. This court asked in
State v. Allen, supra.
Is it permissible for a jury (or a judge) to
completely reverse the expressed intention and
purpose of one accused of crime where the
acts and conduct of the accused are in strict
harmony with and clearly effectuate the expressed purpose and intent?
This court has indicated that where there is a lack of
concealment and stealth in the taking, the defense is
aided. See State v. Allen, supra. Contrariwise, if there
is secrecy surrounding the taking, the conviction is likely to be upheld. See State v. Dubois, supra. At least one
court has held that where concealment is lacking, the
taking is open, and there is no subsequent effort to
conceal the property, there is a presumption of facl
that there is no felonious intent. Stanley v. State, 61
Ok. Cr. 382, 69 P.2d 398 (1937)
Thus, appellant contends that as his expressed intent and purpose and his later and prior conduct
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adions were consistent, and all were inconsistent with
an intent to permanently deprive an owner of his prop.
erty, this court should set aside the verdict of guilty and
declare the effect of the evidence to be inconsistent with
a verdict of guilty of grand larceny.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons above stated, that the verdict is not
supported by the evidence, appellant respectfully sub·
mits that the conviction and judgement be reversed.
Respectfully submitted,

MARGRET S. TAYLOR
Attorney for Appellant

